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THE DANGEROUS PRICE OF INTERVENTION: 
THE LEGAL, SOCIAL & ETHNO-POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF A  
US-LED REGIME CHANGE IN SYRIA 
 
Paul Juzdan 
 
Stability is when the U.K. and U.S. invade a country and impose the regime of their choice.  
 ~ Noam Chomsky 
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 Former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, wrote in The Washington Post that “the 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention explicitly eschews appeals to national interest or balance of 
power.  It justifies itself not by overcoming a strategic threat but by removing conditions deemed 
a violation of universal principles of governance.  That’s all good and well but what of the 
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consequences?”1  This paper will attempt to answer this very question, specifically within the 
context of the recent “Syrian Spring.”2  What would be the international, legal and ethno-
political consequences of a US-led regime change in Syria?  Because Syria is strategically 
located in one of the most volatile areas in the world, an investigation into the consequences of a 
Syrian regime change is a necessary pre-requisite to any debate concerning the future of Syria’s 
“Spring.”  These uprisings have been the topic of conversation for over two years now, usually 
accompanied by debates focusing on the ultimate question: Should the US intervene?     
 Part I of this paper offers a brief history of US foreign engagement after World War II, 
and their ensuing regime change consequences, focusing specifically on Nicaragua, Afghanistan, 
Iraq and Libya.  Part II illustrates the dynamic nature of Syria’s ethno-political landscape and 
offers a brief analysis of how President Assad has dealt with uprisings in the past.  Part III of this 
paper addresses the underlying reasons for the current “Syrian Spring” and analyzes the actions 
taken by the Assad regime as a result of these uprisings.   Part IV outlines the international legal 
implications of intervention, and illustrates how US intervention in Syria would violate 
international law.  Part V deals with the ethno-political consequences associated with a regime 
change in Syria, including an increase in sectarian violence and regional instability.  Finally, in 
Part VI, I will propose several important policy considerations the United States should adopt to 
promote peace and stability in Syria. 
Methodology  
It is important to note from the outset that I am of Syrian Christian descent.  This 
background, along with my personal views concerning the situation in Syria, compels me to 
                                                 
1
 Nick Ottens, Kissinger: Syrian Intervention Will Upset World Order, ATLANTIC SENTINEL (June 5, 2012), 
http://atlanticsentinel.com/2012/06/kissinger-syrian-intervention-will-upset-world-order/. 
2
 This phrase will be used to reference the uprisings taking place in Syria.  The phrase derives its meaning from the 
commonly used term “Arab Spring;” however, since this paper discusses events taking place in Syria, I will instead 
use the phrase “Syrian Spring.” 
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write this paper; with that said, I will make every effort to present the factual information in an 
unbiased and objective fashion.  I seek to offer a clear and concise illustration of the ways in 
which a regime change in Syria would negatively affect the Syrian people and their society.  
Because this paper deals with issues and events that are constantly changing I have decided to 
utilize a variety of news outlets such as CNN,
3
 the BBC,
4
 and the Syrian Arab News Agency 
(SANA),
5
 as primary sources.  These sources may have a tendency to portray certain events in a 
biased fashion; however, this paper will provide the facts found in specific articles and allow 
readers to draw their own conclusions.  Furthermore, because the events surrounding the 
uprisings in Syria are fairly recent, most of the information in this paper will be gathered from a 
wide range of online news outlets, such as the ones mentioned above.  The use of scholarly 
articles, books and United Nations documents will also be employed to strengthen the arguments 
presented in this paper.    
Finally, although this paper focuses specifically on regime change in Syria, there will be 
instances where an analysis of other instances of regime change, as an emerging aspect of 
international relations, will be necessary to prove certain points.  For example, the history of US-
led foreign regime change wears a number of masks including pretenses describing such actions 
as pro-democracy/anti-communist,
6
 acts of self-defense,
7
 and protections of human rights.
8
  In 
response to these classifications, this paper will provide a brief look at these instances of “regime 
change by another name” and outline the consequences such actions may have on the future of 
international relations.  Instances of these classifications will be noted throughout the paper.   
                                                 
3
 CNN, http://www.cnn.com/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2013). 
4
 BBC, http://www.bbc.com/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2013). 
5
 SYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCY, http://sana.sy/index_eng.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2013).  
6
 See infra pp. 3-4.  
7
 See infra pp. 6-8.  
8
 See infra pp. 8-11.  
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Part I: A Brief History of US-led Foreign Regime Change  
 W. Michael Reisman, a Professor of International Law at Yale Law School, defines 
modern regime change as “the forcible replacement by external actors of the elite and/or 
governance structure of a state so that the successor regime approximates some purported 
international standard of governance.”9  Although this phenomenon has garnered much attention 
in the 21
st
 century, with the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, the principle of regime change 
has long been an important part of international relations.  US-backed regime change can be 
traced as far back as the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917;
10
 however, it was not until after World 
War II, specifically during the Cold War, that US-led regime change efforts began to increase 
significantly.  Examples of this can be found in countries such as, Cuba
11
, South Vietnam
12
, 
Nicaragua, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya.  For the purpose of this paper, I will present examples 
of 20
th
 and 21
st
 century regime changes, specifically those occurring in Nicaragua, Afghanistan, 
Iraq and Libya; cases that are closely related to the issues surrounding the Syrian uprisings.   
A. Nicaragua 
In the early 1980s the United States supported the military efforts of a Honduran-based 
counterrevolutionary movement that wished to overthrow the Sandinista government in 
Nicaragua.
13
  The US pledged support to these contras in order to promote regional stability and 
                                                 
9
 W. Michael Reisman, Why Regime Change is (Almost Always) a Bad Idea, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 516 (2004). 
10
 Gibson Bell Smith, Guarding the Railroad, Taming the Cossacks: The U.S. Army in Russia, 1918 – 1920, 
NATIONAL ARCHIVES (Winter 2002), available at http://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2002/winter/us-
army-in-russia-1.html.  This was a time when President Wilson, in attempt to promote democracy and self-
determination, sent troops into Russia.  This intervention was mainly aimed at preserving American interests in 
Russia; however, preventing the formation of a Communist regime was also an essential aspect of the mission.   
11
 See Stephanie Hanson & Brianna Lee, U.S.-Cuba Relations, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (last updated Jan. 
31, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113.  
12
 STEPHAN KINZER, OVERTHROW: AMERICA’ CENTURY OF REGIME CHANGE FROM HAWAII TO IRAQ 155 (2006). 
13
 Thomas J. Pax, Nicaragua v. United States in the International Court of Justice: Compulsory Jurisdiction or Just 
Compensation?, 8 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 471 (1985).  
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free democratic elections.
14
  In 1983, the United States decided to create a group of “Unilaterally 
Controlled Latino Assets” (UCLAs); their task would be to sabotage vital government controlled 
economic installations throughout Nicaragua.
15
  The underlying principle behind the formation 
of these UCLAs was summed up by the words of then CIA Director William Casey, “Let’s make 
the bastards sweat,”16 referring, of course, to the Sandinista government.  Between September of 
1983 and April of 1984 the UCLAs and US Special Forces carried out 19 attacks, most of them 
targeted at Nicaragua’s three oil storage facilities.17  On October 10, 1984 the commandos blew 
up oil storage tanks at Corinto, causing the loss of over 3.2 million gallons of gasoline and diesel 
fuel.
18
  One hundred and twelve people were injured and some 20,000 had to be evacuated from 
the city.
19
  US Special Forces and the UCLAs laid down mines across three ports along 
Nicaragua’s coast; these mines caused serious damage to merchant ships and oil tankers, 
especially those traveling from Mexico.
20
   
This US intervention in Nicaragua had a major impact on international law; the 
controversy gave birth to an influential International Court of Justice (ICJ) case, Nicaragua v. 
United States.
21
  The Court, after asserting jurisdiction,
 22
 proceeded to determine whether or not 
the US violated international customary law and norms by supporting the contras.
23
 The Court 
concluded that the US,  
                                                 
14
 See KINZER, supra note 12, at 100.  (Author notes that if Nicaragua had been left to develop in its own way, it 
might have become a prosperous, democratic and a stabilizing force in Central America.  Instead it is just the 
opposite). 
15
 William M. Leogrande, Making the Economy Scream: US Economic Sanctions Against Sandinista Nicaragua, 
THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY, June 1996, at 340, available at 
http://www1.american.edu/faculty/leogrande/Third_World_Quarterly_1996_Nica_Econ.pdf. 
16
 Id.  
17
 Id. at 341.  
18
 Id.  
19
 Id.  
20
 Id.  
21
 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). 
22
 See Pax, supra note 13, at 485.  
23
 Id.  
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By training, arming, equipping, financing and supplying the contra forces or 
otherwise encouraging, supporting and aiding military and paramilitary activities 
in and against Nicaragua, has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach 
of its obligation under customary international law not to intervene in the affairs 
of another State.”24   
 
The consequences of the Court’s decision will be expounded further in Part IV25 of this paper.  
B. Afghanistan  
 A more recent example of US-led regime change can be found in Afghanistan.  This 
mission, which began on October 7, 2001, was initiated in response to the attacks of September 
11, 2001.
26
  The ultimate goal of the US-led invasion was to root out terrorism by, “dismantling 
al-Qaeda’s base in the region, removing the Taliban from power and ensuring that Afghanis 
enjoy inalienable rights and freedom unfettered by oppression and terror.”27  In December of 
2001, the United Nations Security Council established the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF), which would help NATO establish a new Afghan government.
28
  After NATO and 
ISAF removed much of the Taliban from Kabul and other major cities in Afghanistan,
 29
 the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was established under the leadership of Hamid Karzai (elected 
President in 2004).
30
  Although, the war in Afghanistan began in response to the 9/11 attacks, it 
                                                 
24
 Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at 146.  
25
 See infra p. 24. 
26
 See George W. Bush, Presidential Address to the Nation (Oct. 7, 2001), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html. 
27
 S.C. Res. 1386, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1386 (Dec. 20, 2001).  
28
 Id. 
29
 See Robert Burns & Deb Riechmann, Al Qaeda In Afghanistan Is Attempting A Comeback, HUFF POST WORLD 
(Oct. 21, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/21/al-qaeda-afghanistan-comeback_n_1997994.html. 
(Reports that al Qaeda may be resurfacing in parts of Afghanistan; however, there is clear evidence that their 
presence in the region has greatly diminished.); Alex Spillius, Al-Qaeda So Weak That US Afghanistan Withdrawal 
Would be Justified, THE TELEGRAPH (Jun. 19, 2011 9:18AM),   http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-
qaeda/8584898/Al-Qaeda-so-weak-that-US-Afghanistan-withdrawal-would-be-justified.html.  
30
 AFG. CONST., 2004, pmbl., available at 
http://www.afghanembassy.com.pl/cms/uploads/images/Constitution/The%20Constitution.pdf; Carlotta Gall, 
Election of Karzai Is Declared Official, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2004), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/04/international/asia/04afghan.html?_r=0.  
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quickly evolved into a regime-changing mission.
31
  President Bush in his speech to the American 
people on October 17, 2001 stated,  
More than two weeks ago, I gave Taliban leaders a series of clear and specific 
demands: close terrorist training camps, hand over leaders of the Al Qaeda 
network, and return all foreign nationals, including American citizens, unjustly 
detained in your country. None of these demands were met.  And now the Taliban 
will pay a price.
32
  
 
The institution of a new regime has proven to be a difficult task; since the invasion of 
Afghanistan, the state building process has been met with significant resistance from al-Qaeda 
and Taliban forces.
33
  The United States continues to maintain operations in Afghanistan; 
however, recently US Defense Secretary Chuck Hegal reassured President Karzai that 
“Washington is still on track to wind up its 11-year combat mission in Afghanistan by the end of 
2014.”34  Whether the war in Afghanistan was necessary or justified is not at issue here; it is, 
however, important to note that because the US sought to dismantle the Taliban and institute a 
democratic government, one could fairly classify this war as a regime change mission.
35
  The 
final two regime change efforts, presented below, will offer further helpful context regarding 
US-led regime change efforts. 
C. Iraq 
Iraq, as Professor Reisman points out, was “the Mother of All Regime Changes.”36  
Justifications for this invasion included: 1) noncompliance with UN Chapter VII resolutions, 2) 
the existence of weapons of mass destruction, 3) maintaining the “War on Terror” and 4) ending 
                                                 
31
 S.C. Res. 2096, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2096 (Mar. 19, 2013). 
32
 KINZER, supra note 12, at 277-278 (emphasis added).  
33
 Rani D. Mullen, Afghanistan in 2008: State Building at the Precipice, 49 ASIAN SURVEY 28 (Winter 2009). 
34
 See Matt Smith & Josh Levs, Hagel, Karzai Meet After Strained Afghan Weekend, CNN.COM (Mar. 11, 2003 
5:32AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/10/world/asia/afghanistan-karzai-taliban/index.html?iref=allsearch. 
35
 KINZER, supra note 12, at 280. 
36
 Reisman, supra note 9, at 519. 
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the ongoing human rights violations of the Iraqi government.
37
  This mission proved to be 
strikingly different from the invasion of Afghanistan, mainly due to the lack of international 
support.  Furthermore, the invasion of Iraq lacked international legality; an article published by 
the BBC indicates that Kofi Annan “when pressed on whether the invasion of Iraq as illegal, 
said: ‘Yes, if you wish. I have indicated it was not in conformity with the UN charter from our 
point of view, from the charter point of view, it was illegal.’”38   
The events in Iraq came about mainly because of the US’s expressed concern, in late 
2002, that Saddam Hussein refused to grant UN weapons inspectors, unfettered access to Iraq’s 
arsenals.
39
  In February of 2003, Hans Blix, the UN weapons inspector at the time, indicated that 
he believed Iraq was “making an effort” to cooperate.40  The US, however, rejected any 
indication that Iraq was willing to cooperate.  President Bush, in a speech to the UN General 
Assembly, listed numerous reasons why action must be taken against Saddam Hussein’s 
government.
41
  Bush insisted that “the purposes of the United States should not be doubted.  The 
Security Council resolutions will be enforced, the just demands of peace and security will be met 
or action will be unavoidable and a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its power.”42  
Dismantling Saddam Hussein’s regime was the ultimate goal.43  The reason for the invasion, the 
destruction of Hussein’s nuclear arsenal, proved to be baseless; the United States found no 
                                                 
37
 Id; George W. Bush, President Discusses the Future of Iraq (Feb. 26, 2003), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030226-11.html. 
38
 See Iraq War Illegal, Says Annan, BBC.COM (Sep. 16, 2004), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3661134.stm; Mahmoud Hmoud, The Use of Force Against Iraq: 
Occupation and Security Resolution 1483, 36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 436, 436 (2004).  
39
 See Sean D. Murphy, Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92 GEO. L.J. 173, 248 (2004). 
40
 Blix says Iraq Appears to be ‘Making an Effort’, CNN.COM (Feb. 7, 2003), 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/02/07/sprj.irq.blix/index.html. 
41
 George W. Bush, Speech to the UN General Assembly (Sep. 12, 2002), available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/sep/12/iraq.usa3.  
42
 Id.   
43
 See Bush, supra note 37 (President Bush uses the phrase “remove a threat,” when referring to Saddam Hussein).  
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nuclear weapons in Iraq.
44
  And although the failure to discover weapons of mass destruction in 
Iraq is of significance, the purpose of this paper is not to unearth data concerning this blunder.  
Instead, the relevant point to gather from this war is that because it ended with the overthrow of 
Saddam Hussein and the institution of a new regime, it indicates a willingness on the part of US 
to implement “regime change” where necessary.       
This brief analysis of the US-led invasion of Iraq is also meant to provide an example of 
“regime change by another name;” specifically, under the auspices of “defense” and “human 
rights.”  Another example of this can be found in a discussion concerning the overthrow of 
Qaddafi in Libya; change the regime to protect the population.  The consequences associated 
with these “masked” regime changes, will be analyzed in the discussion concerning the 
“Responsibility to Protect.”45 
D. Libya 
The final example of regime change, and the most recent, is the UN sponsored invasion 
of Libya.
46
 The assessment of this conflict is critical because, similar to Syria, it falls within the 
context of the “Arab Spring.”  Also, the policy considerations surrounding the Libyan invasion 
bear heavily on conversations concerning the Syrian uprisings.  The internal nature of the 
conflict and the foreign support of an internally based opposition group, form an essential basis 
for many of the “Arab Spring” uprisings including those taking place in Libya and Syria.  Since 
these elements are present in Syria, an analysis of the Libyan conflict is an essential pre-requisite 
to a debate centered on possible intervention.   
                                                 
44
 See Report Fuels Iraq WMD Debate, CNN.COM (Oct. 7, 2004), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/10/07/wmd.report.reax/index.html; Robert Bejesky, Weapons 
Inspections Lessons Learned: Evidentiary Presumptions and Burdens of Proof, 38 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 
295, 374 (2011); Iraq WMD 2004: Nuclear, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (last updated Apr. 23, 2007), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/chap4.html#sect1. 
45
 See infra p. 30.  
46
 S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). 
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“Arab Spring” protests in Libya began in February 2011 with a “Day of Rage”, a day 
when “six thousand protestors would take to the streets of Benghazi calling for the overthrow of 
the regime.”47  The uprising spread from the loosely controlled cities of eastern Libya to cities in 
the West, like Tripoli, where protestors set fire to government buildings and engaged 
government forces.
48
  Muammar Qaddafi, Libya’s president, known by many as “the mad dog of 
the Middle East”, responded to the uprisings with an “an appalling level of force.”49  The protests 
eventually morphed into a civil war, and later settled into a protracted stalemate.
50
  In response to 
the increasing violence and deteriorating humanitarian situation in Libya, the UN Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1973.
 51
  The Security Council demanded an immediate ceasefire, an 
end to attacks on civilians, and authorized member states “to take all necessary measures to 
enforce compliance.”52  On March 19, 2011, a coalition of Western states, along with Qatar,53 the 
U.A.E. and Jordan,
54
 began a military intervention in Libya by launching missiles against Libyan 
air defense systems and flying air strikes against military units outside Benghazi.
55
  Tripoli fell to 
the rebels in August of 2011, and two months later rebels found and killed Qaddafi in his home 
town of Surt.
56
   
In response to the events in Libya, President Obama, in a speech given on March 28, 
2011, indicated that,  
Nine days ago, after consulting the bipartisan leadership of Congress, I authorized 
                                                 
47
 JAMES L. GELVIN, THE ARAB UPRISINGS: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 81 (2012).  
48
 Id.  
49
 Id. at 81-82. 
50
 Id. at 82.  
51
 S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). 
52
 Id. 
53
 New Coalition Member Flies First Sortie Enforcing No-Fly Zone Over Libya, U.S. AIR FORCE (Mar. 25, 2011), 
http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123248695. 
54
 The Crisis in Libya, INTERNATIONAL COALITION FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-libya (last visited Apr. 13, 2013). 
55
 Mehrdad Payandeh, The United Nations, Military Intervention, and Regime Change in Libya, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 
355, 379 (2012).   
56
 GELVIN, supra note 47, at 82. 
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military action to stop the killing and enforce UN Security Council Resolution 
1973. We struck regime forces approaching Benghazi to save that city and the 
people within it. We hit Gaddafi's troops in neighboring Ajdabiya, allowing the 
opposition to drive them out. We hit his air defenses to pave the way for a No Fly 
Zone.
57
 
 
The US found itself participating in yet another regime change in the region, this one 
initiated by UN Security Council Resolution 1973.
58
  US participation in the international 
campaign in Libya was by no means a strenuous undertaking.  First, the US had no major 
interests in Libya; Libyan oil accounted for only .6 percent of American oil imports overall.
59
  
Second, the participation in a “no-fly zone” did not require a large military operation; in fact, no 
American soldiers died during the operation.
60
  One could not say the same for a military 
operation in Syria, which would pose numerous tactical and logistical problems.
61
 
Understanding who the Libyan rebels, or “revolutionaries,” are is also essential to 
understanding why this regime change garnered significant international support.  The Libyan 
Transitional National Council (NTC), the main opposition movement, held its first meeting on 
Saturday, March 5, 2011, in the city of Benghazi.
62
 The Council consisted of representatives 
from different cities, Islamists, secular academics and lawyers, reformists and revolutionaries.
63
  
The NTC established a declaration, indicating its goals, duties and structure;
 64
 for example the 
                                                 
57
 Barack Obama, Remarks by President in Address to the Nation on Libya (Mar. 28, 2011), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2011/03/28/president-obama-s-speech-libya. 
58
 See S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 51.  
59
 GELVIN, supra note 47, at 87. 
60
 Id.  
61
 See supra note 205. 
62
 Founding Statement of the Interim Transitional National Council (NTC), THE LIBYAN INTERIM NATIONAL 
COUNCIL (Mar. 5, 2011), available at http://www.ntclibya.org/english/founding-statement-of-the-interim-
transitional-national-council/.  This is unlike the Syrian opposition, which holds meetings outside of Syria. 
63
 GELVIN, supra note 47, at 85. 
64
 Dan Murphy, The Members of Libya’s National Transitional Council, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Sep. 2, 
2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Backchannels/2011/0902/The-members-of-Libya-s-National-Transitional-
Council.  This article lists the 40 members of the NTC and states that the council would be expanded to about 80 
people after Qaddafi was captured. 
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statement indicates that “there should be no less than five youth members on the Council.”65    
The NTC was quickly recognized as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people and on 
September 16, 2011, the UN General Assembly decided that the representatives of the 
Transitional Council would, for the following year, represent Libya in the General Assembly.
66
  
Currently, Libya is governed by the General National Congress, which replaced the NTC on 
August 8, 2012; the Congress elected Ali Zeidan to be prime minister.
67
            
There have been numerous reports outlining the similarities between the conflicts in 
Libya and Syria;
68
 however, the following section will illustrate the inherent inaccuracies of this 
conclusion.  It is only after analyzing Syria’s ethno-political landscape, that one can adequately 
determine whether the similarities between Syria and Libya are based on a logistically sound 
analysis of the current social structure and conflict or on superficial generalizations. 
Part II: Syria’s History and Ethno-Political Landscape    
The main reason Syria is more complex than Libya, is because the present population of 
Syria is characterized by  strong religious and ethnic diversity.
69
  Syria’s population is well over 
22.5 million
70
 with the four largest cities in Syria, Aleppo (with a population 2.985 million), the 
capital city of Damascus (2.527 million), Homs (1.276 million) and Hama (854,000), consisting 
                                                 
65
 The Council’s Statement, THE LIBYAN INTERIM NATIONAL COUNCIL, http://www.ntclibya.org/english/ (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2013).  
66
 Payandeh, supra note 55, at 379. 
67
 See NTC to Transfer Power to Newly-Elected Libyan Assembly August 8, THE TRIPOLI POST (Feb. 8, 2012), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/jan/23/syria-libya-opposition-intervention. 
68
 See Joshua Hersh, Syria U.N. Deliberations Haunted by Ghost of Libya Mission, HUFF POST WORLD (Feb. 12, 
2012 2:31PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/02/syria-un-libya-mission_n_1250232.html.  
69
 NIKOLAOS VAN DAM, THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN SYRIA: POLITICS AND SOCIETY UNDER ASAD AND THE BA’TH 
Party 1 (3d ed. 1996).  
70
 The World Factbook: Syria, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/sy.html (last updated Apr. 10, 2013); Median Age by Sex, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU 
(2011), 
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_11_1YR_B01002&prodTy
pe=table. 
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of over a third of the population.
71
  Sunni Muslims make up about 74% of the population, while 
other sects of Islam including, Alawites, Druze and Shi’a account for about 16% of the 
population.
72
  Other religious minorities include, Christians, who make up about 10% of the 
population, and Jews, who live in small communities throughout Syria---mainly in Damascus, Al 
Qamishli, and Aleppo.
73
  About 90% of the Syrian population is Arab; Kurds, Armenians and 
other ethnic minorities, including Turcomans and Circassians, account for about 10% of the 
population.
74
  Compare this to Libya’s 97% Sunni Muslim population and two main ethnic 
groups, Arab and Berber.
75
  Syria has a strikingly more complex demographic structure and as a 
result, regime change may cause a significant surge in sectarian violence.
76
   Furthermore, the 
presence of these distinct ethnic groups in Syria has led to tension between government forces 
and religious/ethnic groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood; this is not necessarily present in 
Libya.
77
   
This ethnic and religious diversity is the result of a complex set of historical events 
leading up to Bashar al-Assad’s presidency in 2000.  Prior to gaining its independence in 1946, 
Syria was ruled by the French for 26 years, and before that, by the Ottomans.
78
  The French had a 
very interesting method of garnering support; they would enlist members of large and influential 
families into the Troupes Speciales in order to secure the loyalty of the minority communities 
from which they were mainly drawn.
79
  This led to an over recruitment of Alawites and Druze 
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into the armed forces.
80
  Furthermore, many individuals from poor rural areas saw a military 
career as a welcome opportunity to climb the social ladder and to lead a life that would be 
slightly more comfortable than that within the agrarian sector, this again contributed to the strong 
representation of minorities in the Syrian army.
81
  This strong representation of minorities has 
resulted in government policies that tend to favor Christians and Alawites over Sunni Muslims; 
this has had an enormous impact on the current conflict.
82
    
The 1946 Independence movement ignited a series of military coups, which lasted from 
1949 until 1970 when Hafez al-Assad, the father of Bashar al-Assad, took control of the 
government.
83
  This takeover was known as the Corrective Revolution of November 1970.
84
  
Hafez al-Assad’s regime was violently criticized and opposed following the takeover, especially 
by the Muslim Brotherhood who, in February of 1982, ambushed government forces in the 
densely populated city of Hama.
85
  Assad responded to this ambush by moving into the city and 
crushing the insurgency, leaving as many as 10,000 to 25,000 dead in the streets, including about 
1,000 soldiers.
86
  One can see the similarities between Bashar al-Assad’s current actions in 
response to the Arab Spring and those of his father in the 1980s.      
These “coup-proofing” methods helped foster a long period of stability in Syria, which 
came about after a series of ten coup d’états, a record in the Arab world.87  Furthermore, military 
and party discipline during the Assad regime were not undermined by as much sectarian, 
regional and tribal factionalism as in previous times, forming a more stable socio-political 
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atmosphere.
88
  Assad’s economic and foreign relations policies, however, were not as effective; 
in the late 1980’s Assad faced numerous challenges, including a declining economy, an isolated 
foreign policy, and tensions with Israel.
89
  These circumstances would continue throughout much 
of Hafez al-Assad’s presidency, which lasted until his death on June 10, 2000.  Upon his death, 
his son Bashar was elected president for a seven-year term.  Bashar was elected for another 
seven-year term in 2007.
90
   
During Bashar al-Assad’s presidency, and under the Bush Administration, US-Syria 
relations gradually disintegrated.  Several events leading up to this breakdown in US-Syria 
relations include, “the Palestinian intifada of 2000, Syria’s disapproval of the US-led invasion of 
Iraq, the US’s region wide push for democracy, and US open support for regime change in 
Syria.”91  It was not until Obama became president that the US sought to form closer ties with 
Syria.  On February 16, 2010 President Obama nominated Robert Ford to be the United States 
Ambassador to Syria; Ford presented his credentials to President Bashar al-Assad on January 27, 
2011.
92
  Unfortunately, less than a year later, on October 24, 2011 the US was forced to pull 
Ambassador Ford from Syria over security concerns, blaming the lack of safety on President 
Assad’s regime.93  This withdrawal was a result of a series of uprisings that began on March 15, 
2011, the date often used to mark the beginning of the “Syrian Spring.” 
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Part III: Syria’s “Arab Spring” 
A. The “Spring” Begins  
In March of 2011 a group of young boys from Dara’a were arrested for writing 
antigovernment graffiti on a school wall; the children wrote "the people want to topple the 
regime."
94
  According to CNN, on March 16, 2011, a group of female protestors rallied in 
Damascus to demand the release of these students.  One reporter classified these protestors as 
“educated, urbanite youth living in Damascus.”95  Two days after these Damascus protests, the 
parents and relatives of the students marched to the political security building in Dara’a; the 
residents discovered that the children were being beaten and tortured in prison.
96
  During the 
Dara’a protests, security forces shot, injured and killed a number of individuals, triggering days 
of violent unrest that steadily spread nationwide.
97
  In May of 2011, army tanks entered the cities 
of Dara’a, Banyas, Homs and the suburbs of Damascus in an attempt to crush the anti-regime 
protests.
98
  In response to growing domestic and international pressure, President Assad granted 
amnesty to political prisoners, including all members of the previously banned Muslim 
Brotherhood.
99
  The decree freed all political prisoners whose crimes were committed before 
May 31, 2011, and at the time seemed to overturn a law banning the existence of the Muslim 
Brotherhood.
100
  This was a bold step on the part of President Assad, aimed at quickly ending the 
uprisings and appeasing the masses; however, it did little to prevent future unrest.   
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Since that fateful March day in Dara’a, the uprisings have intensified; over 70,000 people 
have lost their lives
101
 and President Assad has faced mounting pressure from the international 
community to end the bloodshed.
102
  Most significantly in December of 2012 the US, along with 
Great Britain, France, Turkey and the Gulf states, recognized the National Coalition for Syrian 
Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, or the Syrian National Coalition, as the “legitimate 
representative of the Syrian people.”103  Furthermore, the beginning of 2013 marked an increase 
in foreign aid to the rebels
104
 and an effort on the part of the regime to combat rebel forces along 
Syria’s desert border with Iraq.105  Numerous reports, issued by a wide range of news outlets, 
have suggested that al-Qaeda may have a role to play in the ongoing strife.  For example, SANA 
issued a report indicating that the terrorist act, which targeted a renowned Syrian scholar and top 
Sunni preacher, “bears the hallmarks of al-Qaeda and its allies.”  CNN echoed a similar concern 
in an article titled, How Islamists are Gaining Ground in Syria.
106
  Clearly, there is a fear that the 
Syrian National Council is far removed from the reality on the ground.  A regime change in Syria 
could potentially result in the formation of a radical Islamist state, which would in turn thwart 
the overall goals of assisting the rebels in establishing a democratic government.       
 Protests in Syria are not a new phenomenon; however, none have been as overwhelming 
as the recent uprisings.
107
  Bashar al-Assad has, in the past, responded to statements made by 
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anti-government forces.  In one instance, in 2000, he was quoted saying,  
When the consequences of an action affect the stability of the homeland there are 
two possibilities… either the perpetrator is a foreign agent acting on behalf of an 
outside power, or else he is a simple person acting unintentionally.  But in both 
cases a service is being done to the country’s enemies and consequently both are 
dealt with in a similar fashion, irrespective of their intentions or motives.
108
        
 
Similarly, on January 6, 2013, President Assad stated in a speech delivered to supporters, 
that “this war targets Syria using a handful of Syrians and many foreigners.  Thus, this is a war to 
defend the nation.”109  What would trigger Assad, an educated, well-rounded leader, to respond 
in such a manner?  In order to answer this question one must understand the nature of the 
opposition. 
B. The Opposition 
According to James J. Gelvin, author of The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to 
Know, the opposition consists of five main components: 1) spontaneous, mostly peaceful crowds, 
2) pro-democracy, pro-human rights, and social media groups (such as Syrian Revolution 
2011,
110
 Sham News Network,
111
 Insan,
112
 Sawasiah, Syrian Observatory for Human Rights),
113
 
3) “Local Coordination Committees,”114 4) the “traditional opposition”, which includes a number 
                                                                                                                                                             
country. The regime quickly crushed this opposition by implementing decrees restricting or terminating almost all of 
what the ‘Damascus Spring’ stood for.   
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of Kurdish and tribal leaders, dissident politicians, and the Muslim Brotherhood and 5) army 
deserters.
115
  Furthermore, the uprisings have resulted in the formation of two important entities, 
the Syrian National Council (hereinafter “the Council”) and the Syrian National Coalition 
(hereinafter “the Coalition”). 116  The Council was formed in August of 2011, insisting that the 
opposition could flourish without violence.
117
  This hope did not last long; in October of 2011, 
members of the Council feared that the Syrian opposition would develop into a Libya-type 
military operation.
118
 The Council’s spokeswoman Bassma Kodmani, stated in an interview with 
a Turkish news outlet, that “in Syria, the majority is concerned that the price of violent 
opposition is very high; the majority know that there are long-term consequences. Nobody wants 
a war; nobody in the opposition wants to see a bombed Damascus.”119  The Council’s fears came 
true rather quickly.   
A little over a year after the formation of the Council, the Coalition was established, 
electing Moaz al-Khatib, a geophysicist from Damascus, as its President.  Immediately following 
the formation of the Coalition, members of the Council joined, and now hold 22 of the 63 
seats.
120
  More recently, on March 19, 2013, the Coalition elected Ghassan Hitto, a former 
Kurdish-US businessman who was born in Damascus, to serve as prime minister of its interim 
government.  Along with the Council, which makes up a majority, the Coalition also includes 
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representation from groups such as, the Kurdish National Council,
121
 Syrian Scholars 
Association, Local Council Leaders,
122
 Turkmens, national figures, and other lesser 
organizations.  Although there is a wide range of representation in the Coalition, divisions among 
certain groups remain.  For example, the Kurdish Democratic Union Party, “a party that controls 
much of Syria’s Kurdish region rejected the new opposition coalition, highlighting the deep 
divisions still remaining between the many Syrian armed groups 20 months into the uprising 
against President Bashar Al Assad.”123   
On the ground in Syria the logistics are not as clear.  For example, the Free Syrian Army 
(FSA) claims to be the “main opposition army group in Syria, composed of defected Syrian 
Armed Forces.”124  The organization further claims that it rose up against Assad because its 
members found it impossible to stay silent, while the regime continued to kill its own people.
125
  
Despite its quest for justice, the FSA has been accused by the United Nations of committing war 
crimes, which has also accompanied claims that the FSA has expelled Christians from cities such 
as Homs.
126
  To further complicate the nature of the opposition, other opposition forces have 
taken hold of cities in Syria.  The al-Nusra Front, recently declared a terrorist organization by the 
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US State Department,
127
 is also an acting agent within Syria.  The relationship between al-Nusra 
Front and the FSA is murky; however, recently it seems the FSA has attempted to separate itself 
from the radical Islamist group.
128
 These attempts, however, do not alleviate concerns that the al-
Nusra will take control of swaths of Syrian territory.  The radical organization issued a YouTube 
video in March of 2013, stating in part:  
The US Government are a bunch of lying lowlifes who only get involved in the 
Syrian Uprising in order to prolong the Conflict and to maintain a Stalemate and 
continuation of the Violence in order to ensure that Syria is completely destroyed 
by the time that Assad is inevitably overthrown. This destruction of Syria serves 
the needs and desires of the US Imperialists and the Zionist Occupiers of 
Palestine.
129
   
 
Of course, there are “‘bad’ Syrian rebels and ‘good’ ones;”130 however, the issue 
surrounding al-Nusra Front’s involvement is not whether the group is comprised of “good” or 
“bad” Syrians, but rather whether the group is aligned with the interests of the main opposition.   
In cities such as Aleppo, al-Nusra Front “is widely identified as the leading force behind the 
Hayaa al-Sharia, which loosely translates as the Sharia Authority.”131  The organization has 
implemented Sharia law and has begun to punish individuals for violating it; one such incident 
occurred recently in the city of Aleppo, where Wael Ibrahim, a veteran activist, had tossed aside 
a banner inscribed with the Muslim declaration of faith.
132
  Ibrahim stated in an interview, with 
an independent senior editor at a Syrian news agency, that “Nusra arrested me on the charge of 
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insulting Islam. They beat me up and detained me for hours, then released me when word of my 
arrest got out. But they warned me to not repeat the offence, and said I was a heretic who should 
be punished.”133  It is unclear how many “Ibrahims” there are across Syria’s rebel controlled 
territories or how many more there will be, as long as organizations such as al-Nusra retain 
control.  Stories, such as Ibrahim’s, give credence to the US’s decision not to arm the rebels; not 
only is it difficult to determine who the rebels are, it is almost impossible to understand the 
impact they will have on a post-Assad Syria.  A New York Times article published on October 
14, 2012 indicates that most of the arms shipped to the Syrian rebels are falling into the hands of 
hardline Islamic jihadists.
134
  The article quotes an American official who states, “the opposition 
groups that are receiving most of the lethal aid are exactly the ones we don’t want to have it.”135  
It is fair to say that the US does not have a clear understanding of the opposition; the recognition 
of the Syrian National Coalition as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people does not 
conform to the realities on the ground.  This murky relationship between the opposition forces in 
and outside of Syria has prompted the US to refrain from sending lethal aid to the rebels.  
However, the US has remained firm in its non-lethal aid commitment; a commitment that 
nevertheless, poses significant problems.    
C. US Support of the Opposition    
 The US has supported the opposition in several ways, the most prominent being the 
formal recognition of the Syrian National Coalition.  Beginning as early as March 25, 2011, the 
Obama administration issued a strongly-worded statement condemning Syria’s brutal repression 
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of the demonstrations; however, it was clear that there would be no US involvement as there was 
in Libya.
136
  On April 29, Obama issued Executive Order 13572 which imposed sanctions on 
certain Syrian government officials and government related entities responsible for human rights 
violations in Syria.
 137
  On May 18, the US issued sanctions freezing the assets of President 
Assad, the Syrian vice-president, and other high-ranking officials; the EU followed suit.
138
  In 
July of 2011, Obama issued a statement concerning Assad’s loss of legitimacy and his inability 
to implement much needed reform.
139
  The president eventually issued a forceful statement 
urging Assad to “step aside.”140   
It was this series of events that led to the withdrawal of US Ambassador Robert Ford in 
October of 2011.
141
  Ford indicated in a hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
that “the US continues to give the Syrian opposition non-lethal aid.”142  Ford outlines three ways 
in which this non-lethal aid has been administered: 1) providing support to prevent al-Qaeda 
influence, 2) helping national and local opposition leaders provide vital services, and 3) 
supporting a unified, inclusive, and effective civilian leadership.
143
  The ambassador concluded 
by stating: “we look forward to working with Congress as we seek to support the needs of the 
Syrian people in their struggle to create a free, stable, and democratic Syria.”144  Unfortunately 
for the US, the inconsistent nature of the opposition, as noted above, has proven to be an obstacle 
on the road to a “democratic” Syria.   
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Numerous individuals within the US government have called on President Obama to take 
steps to arm the Syrian rebels. For example, Congressman Eliot Engel introduced legislation on 
March 18, 2013, giving President Barack Obama the authority to provide rebels in Syria with 
lethal equipment.
145
  Engel told NBC, “I think the Free Syrian Army needs help. We know who 
they are. And I think it's time that we make that move.”146  The question remains: Does the 
Obama administration truly understand the intricate nature of the opposition forces?  One could 
argue that if the US had a good sense of the current Syrian ground war, action would have been 
taken already; it has been two years since the uprisings began and there has been no action.  The 
US knows that arming the rebels or taking any military action against the Syrian government 
would cause an escalation in violence and instability in the region.  Furthermore, the lack of 
unification amongst the rebels gives rise to serious uncertainty concerning a post-Assad Syria.  
Not only would the US’s actions in Syria cause serious instability in the region, it would also 
violate international law.  The following sections will outline regime change within the context 
of international law, which will be used to determine whether a US-led regime change in Syria 
would constitute illegal intervention.  
Part IV: International Law and Regime Change  
A. The United Nations 
 Article 2 of the United Nations Charter includes the following language: “the 
organization [the UN] is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”147  
Furthermore, Article 2 indicates that “all Members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
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state.”148  The General Assembly’s Declaration on the Principles of International Law, the key 
interpretation of the main principles of the UN Charter, indicates that the term “force” should be 
limited to instances of armed force.
149
  The term “threat of force” as used in Article 2 suggests 
that an open and direct threat of force to compel another state to give up territory or yield 
considerable political concessions is also to be considered unlawful under Article 2(4).
150
  
Furthermore, in accordance with this principle of sovereign equality, The Declaration states in 
part, that:  
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for 
any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. 
Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted 
threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and 
cultural elements, are in violation of international law.
151
   
 
The Deceleration also indicates, that:  
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or 
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the 
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States 
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government 
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to 
race, creed or colour.
152
   
 
The UN Charter provides a single exception to the law of non-intervention.  Article 42 of 
the UN Charter allows intervention in circumstances where “such action by air, sea, or land 
forces may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.”153  Furthermore, 
Article 39 grants the UN Security Council the power to determine, “the existence of any threat to 
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the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendation.”154  The 
Security Council has full discretion in determining what constitutes a breach of the peace, act of 
aggression, or threat to the peace.  In the past these elements have extended to domestic affairs, 
such as civil wars, violation of human rights, or the existence of repressive governments.
155
  
Security Council military interventions can often lead to regime change; however, regime change 
should never be the explicit aim or motive of Security Council mandates for intervention.
156
  The 
most recent example of UN mandated intervention is the military actions taken in Libya in 2011.  
It is important to note that the Article 42 exception to non-intervention is confined to actions 
taken by the Security Council, not by individual nations.
157
  The principle concerning 
intervention as a means of curtailing human rights violations, commonly known as the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P), will be discussed in greater detail below. First, let’s take a look 
at the law governing intervention, specifically the law as interpreted by the International Court of 
Justice.    
 B. The International Court of Justice          
 The International Court of Justice has issued several rulings concerning the issue of non-
intervention.  Cases involving the law of non-intervention include, The Corfu Channel Case 
(United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. People’s Republic of Albania), 
Nicaragua v. United States, and Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda.   
In the Corfu Channel Case, the first case ever brought before the ICJ, the United 
Kingdom sued Albania, demanding compensation for the destruction of two British destroyers 
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along the Corfu Channel.
158
  The Court certified two questions: 1) was Albania responsible for 
the explosion that destroyed the British ships and 2) did the United Kingdom violate the 
sovereignty of the Albanian People’s Republic by conducting mine sweeping operations in the 
Corfu Channel.
159
 Focusing on the second question, Great Britain argued that its intervention in 
Albania was meant to secure possession of evidence, in order to submit it to an international 
tribunal and thus facilitate its task.
160
  The Court rejected this defense and stated that it “can only 
regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force, such as has in 
the past, given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot… find a place in international 
law.”161  Furthermore, the Court reasoned that “between independent States, respect for 
territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations.” 162  The Corfu 
Channel Case stands for principles of non-intervention and the importance of maintaining and 
preserving nations’ sovereignty.    
 In Nicaragua v. United States, the ICJ ruled in favor of Nicaragua on the issue of whether 
or not the United States violated international law by aiding the contras.
163
  The Court ruled in 
part that:  
The United States of America, by training, arming, equipping, financing and 
supplying the contra forces or otherwise encouraging, supporting and aiding 
military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua, has acted, against 
the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary 
international law not to intervene in the affairs of another State.
164
       
 
The Court further noted:  
                                                 
158
 See EUROPE SINCE 1945: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA. A-J 224 (Bernard A. Cook ed., 2001) (“The Corfu Channel, the 
stretch of water that divides the Greek island of Corfu from the southern coastline of Albania, is between one and six 
miles wide. These waters were extensively mined by the Axis Powers in World War II”).  
159
 The Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 6 (Apr. 9), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/1/1645.pdf. 
160
 Id. at 34. 
161
 Id. at 35. 
162
 Id. (emphasis added).  
163
 See supra p. 4. 
164
 Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at 123.  
Paul Juzdan The Dangerous Price of Intervention May 2013 
28 | P a g e  
 
By laying mines in the internal or territorial waters of the Republic of Nicaragua 
during the first months of 1984, the United States of America has acted… in 
breach of its obligations under customary international law not to use force 
against another State, not to intervene in its affairs, not to violate its sovereignty 
and not to interrupt peaceful maritime commerce.
165
   
 
The ICJ awarded compensation to Nicaragua; however, the US refused to comply.  
Nicaragua brought the matter before the UN Security Council demanding that all states adhere to 
international law; the US rejected this notion and vetoed the draft resolution.
166
  In a final 
attempt to require compliance, Nicaragua submitted their case before the General Assembly, 
which on November 3, 1986 passed a resolution “urgently calling for full and immediate 
compliance with the Judgment of the International Court of Justice of 27 June 1986 in the case of 
‘Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua’ in conformity with the relevant 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.”167  The US refused to comply, indicating an 
unwillingness to conform to international customary law concerning non-intervention.    
In a speech to the American people President Reagan called funneling aide to the contras 
“a cause of freedom in Central America and the national security of the United States.”168  
Reagan concluded this speech by asking the American people to “give them, give me, your 
support; and together, let us send this message to the world: that America is still a beacon of 
hope, still a light unto the nations.
169
  The reasons behind intervention in Nicaragua relied 
heavily on the importance of preserving democracy in foreign nations, protecting the Nicaraguan 
people from “tyranny” and preventing the spread of a hostile ideology, specifically Communism.  
It is not difficult to see the similarities between motives for intervention in Nicaragua and those 
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in Libya (and potentially Syria); the overthrow of “tyrannical” leaders like Qaddafi and Assad, 
the establishment of democracy and the destruction of hostile ideologies, in these cases 
dictatorships.       
 Finally, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda the ICJ ruled that “Uganda 
by engaging in military activities against the DRC on the latter’s territory, [specifically] by 
occupying Ituri
170
 and by actively extending military, logistic, economic and financial support to 
irregular forces… violated the principle of… non-intervention.”171  The Court reasoned that even 
though Uganda’s objectives did not include the overthrow of the government, they nevertheless 
violated international law by “securing towns and airports for reason of its perceived security 
needs, and in support of the parallel activity of those engaged in civil war.”172  The Court 
recalling the decision it made in Nicaragua v. United States, stated that “the principle of non-
intervention prohibits a State to intervene, directly or indirectly, with or without armed forces, in 
support of an internal opposition in another State.”173  
A US-led regime change, without the support of the UN Security Council, would clearly 
violate international law.  According to the cases cited above, intervening in the internal affairs 
of a country is a clear violation of customary international law and the UN Charter.  The civil 
war in Syria is most certainly an internal struggle between the Assad regime and rebel forces; 
although some foreign nations have a stake in the matter, the struggle is currently confined to 
Syria’s borders.  Similar to the situation in Nicaragua, the United State would be violating 
Syria’s sovereignty by intervening in “the affairs of another State.” 
It is important to note that, with the Security Council’s approval, intervention for the sake 
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of preventing, or ending, “crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocide” 
would be legal under international law.  This principle, known as the “Responsibility to Protect” 
(R2P), was utilized by the Security Council to invade Libya; the principle allows the Security 
Council to use its power to “maintain or restore international peace and security” to change a 
regime, all in the name of human rights.
174
  The next section will illustrate the shortcomings of 
the principle of R2P, because regardless of its international legality it poses numerous socio-
political consequences, specifically within the context of the “Arab Spring.”   
C. R2P    
 R2P, emerged in 2005 as a set of principles based on the idea that sovereignty is not 
merely a right, but a responsibility.
175
  The 2005 World Summit outlines 178 points concerning 
the role of the United Nations and sovereign States in the international community.  Paragraph 
138 states in part that “each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”176  The most crucial aspect 
of this declaration can be found in the following paragraph,   
We are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, 
through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter 
VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional 
organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national 
authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
177
 
 
Effectively, the General Assembly has set forth an ultimatum; either States take steps to protect 
all of their citizens or the Security Council will take action.  The UN Secretary General’s High-
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change put forth list of criteria for intervention in R2P 
cases: 1) Seriousness of threat, 2) Proper Purpose, 3) Last Resort, 4) Proportional Means, and 5) 
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Balance of Consequences.
178
  R2P has been faced with considerable criticism since its inception.  
For example, when, in 2007, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon decided to appoint a “Special 
Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect”, nations such as Cuba, Nicaragua, Egypt, Iran and 
Venezuela expressed deep concerns.
179
  “The criticism was clearly aimed at the attempt to embed 
the ‘responsibility to protect’ in the institutional framework of the United Nations without prior 
consultation of the General Assembly.”180    
 One prominent example of the use of R2P occurred on June 10, 1999 when the UN 
Security Council issued Resolution 1244, “deciding on the deployment in Kosovo, under UN 
auspices, of international civil and security presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel 
as required.”181  The Security Council also “authorized member States and relevant international 
organizations to establish the international security presence… with all necessary means to fulfill 
its responsibility…”182  The central issue in Kosovo was iterated in Security Council Resolution 
1199, which expressed concern over the “flow of refugees into [neighboring] European countries 
as a result of the use of force in Kosovo as well as by the increasing numbers of displaced 
persons within Kosovo, and other parts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, up to 50,000.”183  
Although the UN Security Council expressed numerous concerns over the situation in Kosovo, 
military actions against Yugoslavia were never taken.  Instead, on March 24, 1999, NATO began 
a bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in an effort “to prevent more human suffering, more 
repression, more violence against the civilian population of Kosovo . . . [and] to prevent 
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instability spreading in the region.”184  The Security Council was bypassed; the US and NATO 
realized early on that Russia and China would utilize their veto powers to prevent any 
intervention.
185
  Noam Chomsky, in a book entitled The New Military Humanism: Lessons from 
Kosovo, indicates the ambiguity surrounding the principle of R2P, within the context of Kosovo.  
He states, 
The distinction between worthy and unworthy victims is traditional, as is its basis, 
remote from any moral principle apart from the rights demanded by power and 
privilege. Washington simultaneously rejects the principles of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (for unworthy victims, Palestinians and many 
others) and passionately upholds them (for worthy victims, now Kosovar 
Albanians). Though readily understood in terms of power interests, the 
distinctions, when noticed at all, are portrayed as "double standards" or 
"mistakes" in respectable commentary.
186
 
 
The Kosovo War indicates to the international community that there is some sort of 
“responsibility to protect,” however, it raised an important question: “With whom does that 
responsibility lie?” 
 The Civil War in Libya is probably the most striking example of the UN’s 
implementation of the principle of R2P.  In response to growing concerns of human rights 
violations, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 1973, imposing a no-fly zone over Libya 
and authorizing all necessary means to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas, except for a 
"foreign occupation force.”187  The Security Council strategically included verbiage that would 
prevent any type of occupation force; making is rather difficult to determine the extent to which 
ground forces could be used.
188
  The Security Council utilized the principle of R2P to protect 
civilians and end the conflict; the outcomes of this intervention ultimately included regime 
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change.  This presents legitimate concerns, specifically “What distinguishes R2P from regime 
change?” 
 UN Security Council Resolution 1970 called for steps “to fulfill the legitimate demands 
of the population [of Libya].”189 This same resolution put in place a travel ban and asset freeze 
specifically aimed at Qaddafi, his family, and other high-ranking officials of the regime.
190
  
Furthermore, Resolution 1973, mentioned above, fails to elaborate on the admissible means that 
may be employed in order to implement and achieve the goals surrounding R2P intervention.
191
  
Whether or not the goals put forth under Resolution 1973, were in fact to overthrow Qaddafi or 
merely to protect the citizens of Libya, is of no consequence.  Ultimately, protecting the 
population necessitated a regime change; this was, after all, one of the “legitimate demands of 
the population.”   Some would suggest that the purpose of R2P is to “offer a middle ground 
between impunity for oppression and violent overthrow by strongly supporting the state to find 
its own way to end the oppression, backed up by outside pressure short of regime change.”192  
This may in fact be the primary motive for using the principle of R2P, specifically, protecting 
civilians without overthrowing their government.  However, it seems clear that once R2P is 
implicated the resulting regime change is inevitable.  A request on the part of the international 
community to promote R2P and reject regime change constitutes an unreasonable request on the 
part of intervening forces and the regimes they target.     
R2P in its very nature, encompasses more than a mere in-and-out operation, but rather 
also fosters a responsibility to prevent, react and rebuild;
193
 the principle itself, inadvertently 
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calls for regime change.  The means taken to respond to war crimes in Libya leave the 
international community questioning whether the rules of sovereignty remain a central 
component of international relations.  There remains a broad consensus that “views forcible 
regime change of tyrannies into regimes of democratic rule as a per se illegitimate interference 
into the affairs of other nations, a position likewise conceptualized as foundational in the United 
Nations Charter.”194   
If the US decides to invoke the principle of R2P and invade Syria, the same question 
would arise: Is the goal of intervention in fact aimed at protecting the population or changing the 
regime? An article written by Gareth Evans, former president of the International Crisis Group, 
outlines the importance of properly implementing the principle of R2P.
195
  Evans points out that 
the poor and inconsistent argument that the invasion of Iraq was based on Saddam Hussein’s 
record of tyranny over his own people, “almost choked at birth” the principle of R2P.196  Evans 
offers sound advice concerning the use of force, he states that,  
What is necessary, and I believe rather more realistically achievable, is for there 
to be much more attention paid – not only in academic discourse but in actual 
operational decision-making – to the group of principles which have to be 
satisfied if any decision to use military force is to be not just legal, but 
legitimate.
197
 
 
A legitimate use of force on the part of the Security Council would include an application of 
threshold criteria, an analysis of the weight of the evidence and understanding of the full range of 
threats.
198
  
In Libya, “measures that were employed in order to keep the Qaddafi regime from 
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attacking the civilian population at the same time contributed to the actions of the opposition 
against the regime.”199  Some scholars argue, however, that R2P was properly applied in Libya, 
“as no great power had special interests or close relationships with the Qaddafi regime.”200  
Furthermore, the operation was feasible on the part of the intervening coalition and supported by 
the United Nations Security Council.
201
  Syria, on the other hand, poses numerous logistical 
problems that Libya did not, including “daunting operational challenges and a more complex 
ethnic, tribal, and geostrategic environment.”202  Clearly, logistics should not prevent the 
promotion of human rights; however, they should be considered, specifically in an environment 
where intervention may do more harm than good.  A regime change in Syria that results in the 
institution of an Islamist government will pose a threat to minority groups, including Christians 
and Alawites.
203
  An internationally recognized, legal regime change does not ensure the 
institution of a “democratic” regime.204  Furthermore, Syria’s foreign policy initiatives, under a 
new regime, may work against the interests of peace in the region; it would be hard pressed to 
assume that a new Islamist regime in Syria would retain stable, albeit unfriendly, relations with 
Israel.   
Currently, R2P is not being utilized by the Security Council to determine what actions to 
take in Syria, and it is clear that unilateral intervention in Syria would violate the international 
law of nonintervention.  If, however, an interventionist coalition was formed under the auspices 
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of the Security Council utilizing the principle of R2P, serious issues concerning the means and 
ends of R2P would come to the forefront of international relations law.   Furthermore, 
intervention in Syria as a result of R2P would result in serious ethno-political consequences, 
including a rise in sectarian violence and regional instability.        
Part V: The Ethno-Political Consequences Associated with a Forceful Regime Change in 
Syria  
The Christian Science Monitor published an article in May of 2012, illustrating the 
differences between Syria and Libya.  First, Syria is much larger than Libya in terms of 
population and size (compare Libya’s population of 6.4 million to Syria’s 20.8 million).  Second, 
Qaddafi lost the eastern half of his country within days of the start of the uprisings; unlike Assad 
who retains control of the capital and other strategic locations across the country.
205
  Third, Syria 
has a much larger, more sophisticated and loyal military, not to mention that most of the fighting 
occurs within densely populated cities.
206
  Furthermore, Syria stands as a strategic player in the 
Middle East peace process; Syria has taken steps towards mending the rivalry between Fatah and 
Hamas, the rival political parties within the Palestinian territories.
207
  Most importantly, the 
government of Syria has no ties with al-Qaeda and has repressed other Muslim fundamentalist 
groups (such as the Muslim Brotherhood).
208
  President Assad is not another “mad dog” of the 
Middle East and the international community retains an interest in preserving stability within 
Syria. 
 Another stark difference is the nature of the opposition.  The rebels in Syria have no clear 
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mission or character; there is a legitimate fear that the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime 
will either, 1) expands sectarian violence, ethnic violence, or both, or 2) result in a takeover by 
the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.
209
  Syria’s location also poses several problems for neighboring 
countries, Lebanon to the west, Iraq to the east and Turkey to the north.  The spillover of 
sectarian violence could lead to an unsettling situation in the Middle East.  Furthermore, the 
future of Syrian-Israeli relations under a post-Assad regime would most likely disintegrate; a 
regime founded on radical Islamic principles may not maintain a peaceful relationship with this 
neighbor to the south.
210
      
 The Washington Institute, an organization aimed at improving Middle East policy, 
published a report entitled, Syria After Assad: Heading Toward a Hard Fall?, which expresses 
the concerns associated with a post-Assad Syria. The article states,    
Because most rebel groups are locally based and highly fragmented and have little 
if any contact with the opposition in exile, a unitary state with a strong central 
government is unlikely to emerge from the civil war. The new government will 
likely face great challenges exerting control over local leaders who fought the 
regime and delivered rudimentary services to areas they liberated. Rather than 
surrendering their hard-won gains to some faraway central authority, they might 
prefer to forge alliances with other local leaders (including members of different 
ethnosectarian communities) and/or external powers, as occurred during and after 
Lebanon's civil war.
211
 
 
The disunity between the opposition abroad and the rebels at home will surely complicate the 
formation of a unified government, if Assad were to relinquish power.  Furthermore, the status of 
minority groups, specifically Christians and Alawites, in a post-Assad world would be uncertain 
and potentially ignite a mass exodus.  The Washington Institute also points out that the rise of 
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Sunni’s in Syria may also spark political movements in countries such as Jordan, Iraq, and the 
West Bank, rocking the “political balance of power in these societies.”212      
 Finally, Professor Reisman, outlines ten guidelines for a successful regime change, Syria 
falls well outside these guidelines.
213
  The suggestions include, ensuring a significant amount of 
domestic and internal support for the regime change, ensuring the individual or elite group that is 
the target of regime change does not have an effective internal base, and making certain that the 
costs of a regime change remain low.
214
  The list goes on to recommend that “an acceptable 
alternative government be readily available and that the UN be responsible or prominently 
involved;”215 two impractical expectations surrounding any military intervention measures in 
Syria.  The time to consider alternative measures is at hand.    
Part VI: Proposed Solutions 
 These alternative measures should be implemented by the United States in lieu of 
military intervention.  First, the US should establish a relationship with the current regime in 
order to understand the complex nature of the Syrian ethno-political landscape and the 
importance of maintaining stability in the region.  Second, the US should accurately assess and 
understand the nature of the opposition before declaring its legitimacy.   Finally, the US should 
end its aid to the rebels and urge other nations to follow suit; this aid only has the effect of 
prolonging the war and causing more death and destruction.  
President Obama began his presidency on the right track; rejecting the anti-Syria rhetoric 
of the Bush administration.  In attempting to reignite relations with the Syrian government he 
appointed the first US Ambassador to Syria in five years.  In February of 2010, the United States 
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sent Under-Secretary of State William Burns on visit to Syria to meet with President Assad and 
improve US-Syrian relations.
216
  In July of 2010 Arlen Specter, a US Senator from Pennsylvania, 
“had a constructive and in-depth conversation about the formidable challenges facing the region 
and ways in which the US and Syria can overcome those challenges.”217  These examples 
illustrate that the Obama administration did, at one point, see a need for strong US-Syrian 
relations; Hillary Clinton at one point was quoted saying, “President Assad is a reformer.”218  
The Assad regime is facing troubling times; the US should assist the Syrian government in 
peacefully implementing reform.  Of course Assad’s barbaric attacks on civilian populations are 
inexcusable; however, as presented in this paper, a regime change would have consequences that 
far outweigh the present turmoil.   
Furthermore, concerning the opposition, the US has been quick to recognize the Syrian 
Coalition as the “legitimate representative of the Syrian people;” however, is this truly the case?  
With al-Nusra Front and the Muslim Brotherhood on the ground in Syria, it is difficult to believe 
that the Coalition has control over all the opposition forces.  Finally, the US in effect has 
prolonged the Syrian conflict by providing aid to the rebels.  If the US wishes to end the conflict 
in Syria it should take steps to do so, this would include either taking out Assad (an action that 
would have long-lasting negative consequences) or relinquishing aid to the rebels and assisting 
in the speedy restoration of order.   
Conclusion            
 The actions taken by the Assad regime have triggered concern across in the international 
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community, and rightfully so.  The death of tens of thousands of Syrians and the destruction of 
cities across the country is heart wrenching, especially for those who have lost friends and family 
members.  Regime change, however, is not the answer.  Preserving stability in Syria is in the best 
interests of the US and the region; it is far-fetched to assume that in a post-Assad Syria, 
American democracy will take hold and flourish.  We have seen the consequences of past regime 
changes and the unwillingness on the part of the US to conform to international law preserving 
sovereignty.  A military intervention in Syria would mean the death of thousands of individuals, 
the rise of sectarian violence and an unstable Middle East.  The negative effects would far 
outweigh the benefits of deposing a dictator.  Lastly, military intervention on the part of the US 
alone, the Security Council, or NATO would have serious international legal consequences.  If 
intervention for the sake of regime change becomes an international norm, we can bid farewell to 
the sovereign state and welcome an age of democratic tyranny under the guise of R2P. 
